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The past few years have witnessed the increasing ubiquity of user-generated content on seller 
reputation and product condition in Internet based used-good markets. Recent theoretical models 
of trading and sorting in used-good markets provide testable predictions to use to examine the 
presence of adverse selection and trade patterns in such dynamic markets. A key aspect of such 
empirical analyses is to distinguish between product-level uncertainty and seller-level uncertainty, 
an aspect the extant literature has largely ignored. Based on a unique, 5-month panel dataset of 
user-generated content on used good quality and seller reputation feedback collected from 
Amazon, this paper examines trade patterns in online used-good markets across four product 
categories (PDAs, digital cameras, audio players, and laptops). Drawing on two different 
empirical tests and using content analysis to mine the textual feedback of seller reputations, the 
paper provides evidence that adverse selection continues to exist in online markets. First, it is 
shown that after controlling for price and other product and seller-related factors, higher quality 
goods take a longer time to sell compared to lower quality goods. Second, this result also holds 
when the relationship between sellers’ reputation scores and time to sell is examined. Third, it is 
shown that price declines are larger for more unreliable products, and that products with higher 
levels of intrinsic unreliability exhibit a more negative relationship between price decline and 
volume of used good trade. Together, our findings suggest that despite the presence of signaling 
mechanisms such as reputation feedback and product condition disclosures, the information 
asymmetry problem between buyers and sellers persists in online markets due to both product-
based and seller-based information uncertainty. No consistent evidence of substitution or 
complementarity effects between product-based and seller-level uncertainty are found. 
Implications for research and practice are discussed. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
     Internet based used-good markets, e.g., Amazon and E-Bay, reduce search and 
transaction costs for buyers and sellers and facilitate product exchanges that would not be viable 
in a comparable brick-and-mortar environment (Ghose et al. 2006). IT-based artifacts play a key 
role in making these online markets work. Examples include reputation systems that highlight 
buyer-generated feedback on transactions (Dellarocas 2003, Ghose et al. 2005, 2007) and product 
diagnostic tools that highlight seller-generated content on product condition disclosures (Jiang and 
Benbasat 2007). 
   In traditional offline retailing, buyers can predict the outcome of a transaction by 
assessing the seller and the product characteristics in a deterministic manner. However, in online 
used-good markets such characteristics cannot always be reliably described or verified prior to a 
transaction. While attributes such as product features can be communicated easily in electronic 
markets, “non-digital” attributes, such as product condition and seller integrity, are subject to 
noise and manipulation, producing an information asymmetry problem for electronic markets. 
This information asymmetry can lead to adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Akerlof 
1970) and is often associated with uncertainty from two sources: A seller's personal 
characteristics, such as seller quality; and secondly, a product's attributes, such as condition of the 
used-product.2  
 User-generated feedback posted in seller reputation profiles contains buyer assessments of 
these characteristics. These assessments can potentially augment the richness of information in the 
composite numerical reputation scores (Ghose et al. 2005, 2007) and alleviate information 
uncertainty. However, this proposition remains to be empirically tested. Our study considers the 
two sources of uncertainty and their relationship to trade patterns, such as sale time and price 
decline of used goods, and then explores whether adverse selection occurs in online used-good 
markets. This becomes important since the viability of Internet-based, used-good exchanges is 
likely to hinge on whether non-technological, but fundamentally economic, issues like adverse 
selection are identified and addressed. 
  Uncertainty about seller quality can arise from risks involved in the transaction, such as 
failure to deliver on time, an error in shipping the right product, or intentionally misrepresenting 
the product (Ghose et al 2005, Pavlou et al. 2006, Ghose et al. 2007). The nature of online 
exchanges generally prevents buyers from using social cues (e.g., physical interaction and body 
                                                 
2Adverse selection can arise from pre-contractual misrepresentation of the seller’s true attributes and offering of false 
product information. Moral hazard can arise from the seller’s post-contractual shirking, contract default, fraud or 




language) to assess seller quality (Gefen et al. 2003). Uncertainty about product condition can 
arise when buyers cannot physically evaluate a product until after delivery and payment. The 
buyer must, therefore, rely on the seller’s self-reported product condition to assess quality, 
knowing that the seller may not disclose the true condition of the used good. This is particularly 
true for used electronics products since their quality cannot be fully assessed before purchase.  
The presence of this information asymmetry leads to a “lemons” problem where low-
quality goods drive out high-quality goods in static markets (Akerlof 1970). Basically, if true 
quality is not observable at the time of transaction, sellers of high quality goods have little 
incentive to transact at discounted prices that reflect the average quality of goods traded. As 
sellers with high-quality goods leave the market, both price and average quality spiral downward, 
leaving only the "lemons". Consequently, when valuation depends on quality of goods and the 
market is static, market failure manifests itself by higher quality goods not being traded despite 
the potential gains from such a trade. User-generated reputation feedback, therefore, plays a vital 
role in influencing economic exchanges by shedding light on the various dimensions of a seller’s 
historical performance in the same market (Ghose et al 2005, Pavlou and Dimoka 2006, Ghose et 
al. 2007). 
Despite the existence of seller and product quality uncertainties, the prior literature has 
primarily focused on the effect of seller quality uncertainty through examining reputation ratings 
and user-generated textual feedback (Dellarocas 2003, Ghose et al. 2005, Pavlou and Dimoka 
2006, Ghose et al. 2007). Since the intermediary hosting the online market does not always 
guarantee these characteristics, these markets rely on reputation systems to substitute for the 
protocols that one takes for granted in face-to-face transactions. Some of the prior research has 
examined perceived diagnosticity, which allows easier product evaluation in electronic shopping 
(Jiang and Benbasat 2007). However, research on highlighting how product condition affects 
information uncertainty in online markets is nascent. We argue here that product condition 
uncertainty is an equally important feature of these electronic markets, and its impact needs to be 
explicitly measured and analyzed in conjunction with seller quality uncertainty. This paper 
contributes to the emerging stream of work that highlights product-level uncertainty in online 
markets, such as that of Dimoka and Pavlou (2008). Their paper reveals the stronger impact of 
product uncertainty on price premiums and sales, compared to seller uncertainty and highlights 
the important product information signals in the used car market. In contrast, our paper focuses on 
sale time and trade volumes for used electronic goods to reveal that seller-level and product-level 
uncertainty together affect trading patterns. 
Prior work has focused on the effect of price as a sorting mechanism in markets 
characterized by information asymmetry. Recent theoretical work (Janssen and Karamychev 
 4
2002, Blouin 2003, Janssen and Roy 2004) indicate that sale time plays an important role in 
sorting the effects of information uncertainty in such markets. In a static market, low quality 
goods drive out high quality goods through adverse selection (Akerlof 1970). However, in a 
dynamic market with entry and exit by buyers and sellers, the outcome can be quite different. In 
such markets, the “lemons problem” caused by adverse selection is not about the impossibility of 
trading high quality goods, but rather that sellers of higher quality goods need to wait and, wait 
longer to complete a trade than sellers with lower quality goods. The welfare loss from waiting in 
such markets is the main index of market failure caused by asymmetric information (Janssen and 
Roy 2004). 
In sum, our main objective is to test for the presence of adverse selection in online 
exchanges for used goods, using an analysis of buyer-generated content about sellers and seller-
generated content about products. We proceed in two ways. First, we examine the relationship 
between sale time and product condition as well as sale time and seller reputation to test if higher 
quality goods and higher reputation sellers take a longer time to sell than others. Second, we 
investigate trade patterns, such as the volume of the used good traded and the residual price of the 
used good as a function of the intrinsic reliability of the brand. We control for indirect quality 
indicators embedded in user-generated feedback on seller reputation, used-good condition, and 
sale price. The analyses shed light on the extent of adverse selection in such markets (Gilligan 
2004) to corroborate the results from the first analysis. 
     Evidence of the insights in Akerlof's (1970) seminal work is mixed in contemporary 
durable goods markets. Bond (1984) finds weak evidence of adverse selection among older trucks 
only. Lacko (1986) analyzes the distribution of repair costs for used cars bought through a variety 
of channels and finds that for cars that are less than seven years old, the distribution of repair costs 
is similar for all used cars. Both Bond (1984) and Lacko (1986) determined that as vehicles get 
older, the quality of vehicles sold in the used market becomes lower. Genesove (1993) then 
discovers only slight evidence of adverse selection in dealer auction markets for used cars. Studies 
using data from electronic markets have also produced mixed results. Garicano and Kaplan (2001) 
analyze the wholesale automotive market and conclude that this electronic market was not 
affected by adverse selection because of safeguarding policies implemented by the market-maker. 
In contrast, Fabel and Lehmann (2000), and Emons and Sheldon (2002) find stronger support for 
the existence of adverse selection in the used automobile markets on the Internet. Dewan and Hsu 
(2004) find evidence of adverse selection on eBay in their analysis of collectible stamps. Using 
data for sales of Corvettes on eBay, Adams et al. (2005) do not find empirical support for adverse 
selection. Conversely, Wolf and Muhanna (2005) do find some evidence in the context of used 
cars; newer cars and cars with low mileage are less likely to sell on eBay. Lewis (2007) then finds 
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that seller disclosures through online media tools can reduce adverse selection problems for used 
cars on eBay. Overby (2008) further finds that there is adverse selection for used cars in the 
physical market, which is dependent on product type. 
While these prior studies primarily focus on auctions of stamps and automobiles, our study 
is based on a panel dataset that contains a wide variety of electronics goods sold through posted 
prices on Amazon. The data reflects a five-month period from February to July 2005 from 
Amazon.com. The products included laptops, PDAs, digital cameras, and audio players. The 
sample set within each product category consists of fairly homogenous goods, similar in features 
and manufacturer brand reputation when new. However, once used, these items become 
heterogeneous due to a disparity in used-product condition and diversity in seller reputation 
profiles. These aspects allow us to isolate the impact of the two sources of uncertainty that are 
inherent in such online markets: seller-specific and product-specific characteristics.  
     To summarize, three key differences differentiate this paper from the existing empirical 
work on adverse selection. First, prior work primarily focuses on theories of adverse selection in 
static markets where price is a sorting mechanism. In contrast, our paper tests the theory in the 
recent literature on dynamic markets (Janssen and Karamychev 2002, Blouin 2003, Janssen and 
Roy 2004) where time is a sorting mechanism in addition to price. The basic idea of time-based 
sorting is that sellers face a tradeoff between making a quick sale and obtaining a high price. 
High-quality sellers resolve this issue by setting a higher-than-average price and waiting longer on 
the market. In the end, all goods are traded, but high-quality goods sell with a delay. Second, the 
emphasis in the prior work is primarily on information uncertainty due to seller reputation (see 
Dellarocas 2003 for a review). In contrast, we investigate the impact of both product condition 
and seller reputation induced information asymmetry. Third, our paper examines trade patterns 
and adverse selection using data from electronic used-good markets where product prices are 
posted, unlike online auctions where buyer valuations and other auction characteristics (such as 
the reserve auction format, relative opening price, and  number of bids)  play an explicit role in 
determining successful bids (Gilkeson and Reynolds 2007). Our setting thus allows a relatively 
cleaner examination of how seller characteristics affect trade patterns in markets with adverse 
selection. Because durable goods also have different price decline rates, we are able to identify the 
effect of adverse selection based on theoretical predictions from prior work that associate price 
declines with trade volumes for brands with varying reliability (Hendel and Lizzeri 1999). 
 In the next section, we present the theoretical framework on which the hypotheses are 
formulated. The data and the different variables used in the empirical analysis are then described 
in the following section. Thereafter, we present the empirical methodology for testing the various 
hypotheses and discuss the empirical evidence. Finally, we present a summary of the 
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contributions of the study and discuss managerial implications as well as limitations. The final 
section concludes the discussion. 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Sale Time and Product Uncertainty 
The prior literature has shown that in a dynamic market for durable goods wherein goods 
are continuously traded, there exist equilibria where all sellers, no matter how high the quality of 
their good, may be able to trade in finite time (Stolyarov 2002, Janssen and Roy 2004, Janssen 
and Karamychev 2002, Blouin 2003). Although certain indicators like the seller's self-reported 
product quality and seller reputation ratings are available to buyers, information asymmetries are 
likely to persist in electronic markets because buyers and sellers are separated by time and space. 
In such used-good markets, uncertainty caused by asymmetric information manifests itself by 
sellers’ with relatively high quality goods needing to wait longer than sellers with low quality 
goods to successfully complete a trade. Even though all goods are traded, market failure arises as 
future gains from the trade are discounted (Janssen and Roy 2004). 
  The market described by Akerlof (1970) involves centralized trade, wherein a large 
number of agents exist on both sides of the market, and all agents have simultaneous access to the 
same trading opportunities. In contrast, trade can also be decentralized, when a market is created 
by the random matching of agents in pairs. Such a situation describes the market for online used, 
durable good markets, among others (Nagler and Osgood 2006). When used-good trade is 
decentralized, (i) all transactions need not occur at the same price, and (ii) both price and time are 
adjustment mechanisms (Blouin 2003). The intuition is as follows: The seller in a decentralized 
market faces a tradeoff between quoting a high price vs. quoting a low price.  If the seller quotes a 
high price and sells the item, he or she will garner a greater profit, but may have to wait longer for 
the good to sell in the first place. On the other hand, quoting a low price may lead to a quicker 
sale but with a lower profit. 
      How a seller responds to this tradeoff depends on the reservation price, which in turn 
depends on the quality of the good being sold. Therefore, sellers with high-quality and low-
quality products, despite possibly having the same discount factor, do not account for time in the 
same way. High-quality good sellers will wait longer to get a higher price. At the market level, 
this phenomenon exhibits itself by low-quality goods’ selling earlier than high-quality goods even 
after controlling for price (Janssen and Karamychev 2002, Janssen and Roy 2004). The natural 
outcome is an accumulation of high quality good sellers in the marketplace, relative to low quality 
good sellers.  
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     This basic intuition is quite robust across different modeling specifications. Inderst and 
Muller (2003) consider a used market for durable goods where sellers have private information 
about the good's quality. In contrast to the standard (static) analysis, these authors show that 
equilibrium goods of different qualities sell at different prices, with higher quality goods 
circulating longer than lower quality goods. Other studies, such as those by Janssen and 
Karamychev (2002) and Janssen and Roy (2004) have shown that this phenomenon occurs even 
in centralized markets when the good is durable.  
In the context of durable goods, such as electronic products, what drives sellers with high 
quality goods to quote a higher price is the residual (use) value of the good as well as its exchange 
(or trade) value. Essentially the key concept in the prior work has been that durable goods have a 
use value in every period in which the good is owned (Janssen and Karamychev 2002, Blouin 
2003, Janssen and Roy 2004). The utility to the sellers’ holding on to the used good while it is 
waiting to be sold increases its residual value. Hence, sellers with high quality goods are willing 
to list that good at a higher price, whereas low quality good sellers have less incentive to wait 
before selling the good (due to its lower use value). On the other hand, buyers are interested in 
buying the used-good because their utility from that purchase exceeds the reservation value of the 
seller. In sum, the circulation time of a used good, that is, the time it takes for a used good to sell 
after being listed, performs the role of a sorting mechanism in markets characterized by 
information asymmetries. We expect to see the sale time of a used product vary with its condition. 
Thus, we offer the following hypothesis: 
     H1 (Sale Time and Product Uncertainty): All else equal, higher quality goods take a longer 
time to sell than do lower quality goods in a used-good market.  
2.2 Sale Time and Seller Uncertainty 
Besides a product's condition, the intrinsic capability of a seller to fulfill contractual 
obligations during a transaction also affects buyer perception of the overall quality. However, 
sellers in an electronic market differ widely in their ability and integrity when honoring a contract. 
This knowledge is typically private information that is known to sellers and unknown to buyers. 
To alleviate this information asymmetry, buyers use the information contained in a seller’s 
reputation profile to estimate their expected utility from the transaction. Reputation systems are 
designed to build trust and minimize risk, thus minimizing the adverse effects of information 
asymmetry between buyers and sellers (Ba and Pavlou 2002). A greater number of feedback 
postings, however, typically suggests a relatively more experienced seller. Further, a higher 
number of positive scores and a lower number of negative scores signal a high quality seller. This 
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aspect can increase a buyer's perceived sense of familiarity and create a level of trust that 
facilitates a transaction between two strangers (Resnick et al. 2006).  
There is an emerging stream of literature that documents evidence of a growing market for 
reputation feedback manipulation in electronic commerce. Brown and Morgan (2006) show that 
users on eBay artificially boost their reputations by selling items for very low prices in exchange 
for positive feedback from the buyer. Such blatant manipulation of reputation information can 
decrease user trust and credibility for these indicators. Bolton et al. (2004) show that while the 
feedback mechanism induces quite a substantial improvement in transaction efficiency, the 
mechanism also presents a kind of public goods problem in that the benefits of trustworthy 
behavior are not completely internalized, resulting in persistent moral hazard problems.  
Reichling (2004) demonstrate empirically that eBay’s feedback system documents 
successful transactions, but often fails to inform users of unsuccessful ones. Specifically, the 
timing of feedback indicates that users sometimes withhold feedback to retaliate against any 
negative feedback they may receive, with the result that some low quality transactions will get 
positive feedback. Yamagishi and Matsuda (2004) also argue that the effectiveness of online 
reputation systems to contain the lemon problem is compromised because dishonest sellers can 
move to alternate e-markets without paying any major entry or exit costs. Indeed, an existing 
stream of research argues that current online reputation systems are unable to completely alleviate 
the information asymmetry problem due to the presence of feedback spamming and manipulation. 
Buyers are unable to reliably parse between lower reputation and higher reputation sellers, leading 
to a decrease in perceived average reputation scores in the market.  
This intuition is similar to the decrease in average product quality perceived by buyers in 
markets with adverse selection (Akerlof 1970). In such scenarios, higher reputation sellers will 
take a longer time to sell their products than will lower reputation sellers after controlling for all 
other factors, such as sale price and product condition. In other words, we expect to see sellers 
with higher reputation (measured in terms of average reputation scores or proportion of positive 
feedback postings) have to wait longer than sellers with lower reputation in a market with adverse 
selection. Thus, we have the following two hypotheses: 
H2a (Sale Time and Seller Uncertainty): All else equal, sellers with a lower reputation score 
will take less time to sell compared to sellers with a higher reputation score in a used-good 
market.  
H2b (Sale Time and Seller Uncertainty): All else equal, sellers with a higher proportion of 
positive(negative) feedback postings will take more(less) time to sell compared to sellers with a 
lower proportion of positive(negative) feedback in a used-good market.  
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2.3 Price Decline, Product Reliability, and Trade Volume 
 Recent theoretical work (Hendel and Lizzeri 1999) showed that asymmetric information 
about quality is reflected in quality degradation rates and volume of trade of used products. Two 
key variables that determine the volume of trade in a used-good market are: (i) the difference 
between the price of the new and used good – the durable good’s price decline, and (ii) the 
proportion of units of a particular type of durable good traded in the used market – the good's 
volume of trade. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) then established the relationship between these two 
variables under alternative scenarios for the distribution of information in the used, durable goods 
market. They pointed out that depreciation and adverse selection lead to countervailing effects on 
trade volume. A more closely related work is Gilligan’s (2004) who determined an inverse 
relationship between price decline and trading volume, in this instance for less reliable brands of 
used aircraft models.  
    Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) studied two phenomena that affect the distribution of products 
traded in a used-good market. The first phenomenon is efficient sorting, where used vehicles, the 
conditions of which have deteriorated since purchase, are sold to consumers who value the used 
product more highly. This process is driven by the gains from trade that arise due to heterogeneity 
in consumer tastes for the used good’s condition. The second phenomenon is adverse selection 
and is driven by uncertainty about the quality of the used product among buyers.  
Both Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) and Gilligan (2004) describe the intuition driving these 
two phenomena by presenting a similar example. Under complete information, buyers and sellers 
of used durable goods are symmetrically informed about quality. When product quality 
deterioration is small, some consumers will retain ownership of their used good, rather than 
incurring the transaction costs associated with trade. When quality deterioration is large, relative 
to the transaction costs of trading, more consumers will wish to sell their used good and purchase 
a new good in the current period. Thus, durable good’s volume of trade is directly related to 
quality degradation. Under these circumstances, the price decline is larger and the volume of trade 
is greater for the brand that deteriorates faster. In other words, if the brand whose price 
deteriorates faster has a larger volume of trade, then a steeper price decline is explained by 
depreciation induced efficient sorting.3   
                                                 
3Intuitively, consumers who buy new cars have higher valuations for product quality; hence, such consumers replace 
cars that deteriorate quickly more frequently. This phenomenon is also empirically corroborated by Porter and Sattler 
(1999) and Stolyarov (2002) who show that goods that depreciate faster as reflected by a steeper price decline in the 
used good price have higher trade volumes in a market with perfect information (no information asymmetry). Using 
the prediction from Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), namely, that adverse selection and efficient sorting both increase the 
rate of price depreciation, Schneider (2006) considers their joint effect to be an upper bound on the effect of adverse 
selection in used car markets. 
 . 
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Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) also explain how adverse selection can be caused by 
incomplete information between buyers and sellers. Since sellers receive a price that is consistent 
with average unobserved condition in a market with imperfect information, owners of higher 
quality products would receive lower prices, while owners of lower quality products would 
receive higher prices than when buyers have perfect information. Consequently, incentives 
resulting from these price disparities affect the trade volumes and qualities of the vehicles (how 
reliable they are) that do trade. With asymmetric information, the true quality of the used durable 
good is known only to the seller, not to potential buyers. Intuitively, when uncertainty about 
durable good quality is large, a higher proportion of users will retain their used goods rather than 
sell them at a price equal to the average quality of that specific used good. Hence, price declines 
are larger, and volumes of trade are lower in this instance than in situations where used good 
quality can be precisely determined by buyers (Gilligan 2004).   
In sum, Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) show that if a brand with a steeper price decline has a 
lower volume of trade, this aspect is evidence of adverse selection.  Similarly, Gilligan (2004) 
demonstrates that when there is asymmetric information in the market, price declines and trading 
volumes are inversely related. That relationship becomes stronger with an increase in the 
unreliability of the brand. Basically, since adverse selection is predicted to decrease the number of 
high quality products in the distribution of traded products, those products with lower intrinsic 
reliability (leading to more information asymmetry) will have even lower volumes of trade and 
increases in price declines (Schneider 2006). The next hypothesis tests for the presence of adverse 
selection in electronic markets. We expect to see the price decline of a used product vary directly 
with its unreliability and increasing unreliability to reinforce the negative relationship between 
price decline and trade volume. Thus, we have the following hypotheses: 
H3a (Price Decline and Product Reliability): All else equal, in the presence of adverse 
selection, an increase in unreliability is associated with an increase in price decline of the 
product.  
H3b (Price Decline, Trade Volume, and Product Reliability): All else equal, in the presence 
of adverse selection, there is an inverse relationship between price decline and volume of trade 
for more unreliable products.   
3. DATA  
 To test the hypotheses presented above, we compile a market-level data set for a cross-
section of used good sellers from four different categories. This data was compiled from publicly 
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available information for used product listings at Amazon, using automated Java scripts to access 
and parse HTML and XML pages downloaded from the retailer. The data accrued from the 5-
month period from February to July in 2005. The dataset consists of four kinds of electronic 
goods, including laptops, digital cameras, audio players, and PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants) 
available and sold regularly on the used marketplace at Amazon. A detailed description of the 
variables constructed from the dataset and deployed in the empirical models is given in Table 1. 
For each of these four categories, our sample set consists of unique products that were a mix of 
best-selling products (based on Amazon popularity rankings) and randomly selected products. 
The selection of random goods was done across the major brands in each category to ensure a 
representative sample of those products and to ensure that we did not have an over-representation 
of reliable or unreliable brands in each category. Specifically, the dataset has 122 models of 
PDAs, 177 models of digital cameras, 162 models of audio players and 242 laptop models, but 
sales during the period of our data were concentrated in a fraction of these products. 
 Product Characteristics: These electronics products provided a robust environment to 
test theories of information asymmetry because of the high number of “high quality” electronic 
goods sold on the used-good market and helped us disentangle the impact of inherent product 
reliability from the natural usage-based quality degradation of the durable good. From the 
secondary (used-good) market for each product, we collect data on the used good’s listing date, 
the number of used goods available for sale, seller characteristics, the offer position, the initial 
listing price, and the good’s quality condition. The product condition was self-reported by the 
seller and was classified as either “New”, “Like New," “Refurbished”, “Very Good," “Good," or 
“Acceptable”.  These conditions are coded in our dataset on a scale from 1 to 6, with 6 denoting 
the highest quality (New) and 1 denoting the lowest grade (Acceptable).  See Figure 1a for an 
example of a screenshot of the product condition description page on Amazon’s used good 
market. From the new good market section on Amazon, we also collect data on the new good 
price listed by the manufacturer, the retailer’s price for the new good, the sale rank, and the 
average valence and volume of reviews for that product. 
 Seller Reputation: The reputation data from Amazon’s marketplace includes a summary 
of scores (or ratings) given to each seller by buyers who have completed transactions with that 
seller in the past. The ratings are on a scale of 1 5−  stars. All ratings 2<=  are denoted as negative 
whereas all ratings 4>=  are denoted as positive. A rating of 3  is categorized as a neutral rating. 
These ratings are also averaged for an overall feedback rating displayed on each seller’s profile. 
In addition to an average overall score, Amazon also reports the number of positive, neutral, and 
negative postings obtained over the seller’s lifetime. In our sample, the proportion of neutral 
ratings was extremely small (about 1.5% on average), and hence in our robustness tests, we focus 
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only on the proportion of positive and negative ratings. See Figure 1b for an example of a 
screenshot of the reputation profile of a seller on Amazon. Some typical positive and negative 
comments are listed in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 The sellers on Amazon’s used-good market are individuals and larger, well-established 
sellers called “Pro-Merchants”. Examples of Pro-Merchants are Office Depot and J&R, who 
despite being Amazon's competitors, are allowed to sell products on its marketplace. Amazon 
makes money through listing fees ($ 0.99 per listing) as well as used-good commission fees (a 
percentage of the used-good selling price that ranges between 6 and 15%). Amazon waives the 
listing fee for “Pro Merchant Subscribers, instead charging them a fixed fee per month for 
membership. Specifically, there were 62 unique sellers of PDAs, 83 unique sellers of digital 
cameras, 87 unique sellers of audio players, and 102 unique sellers of laptops. Only a fraction of 
all sellers who posted a used good listing made a sale during the 5-month period of our data.  
 Used Good Sales: Amazon added a new variable to their XML data feed in 2004 which 
allows us to obtain accurate measures of used good sales. Basically, Amazon added a unique 
product identifier, known as a Listing ID for each product listed in the used-good market. 
Similarly, each seller is also given a unique Seller ID by Amazon. To test our first hypothesis, we 
need to find the time period that the used goods circulated in the market. Hence, we need to gather 
information on the sale time of used products from our data. We need information on which good 
sold on which date (say, day Y) after being listed on day X. Towards, this we formulate a dataset 
of used-product sales, using Amazon.com’s XML data feed for website use techniques similar to 
prior work in that area (Ghose et al. 2006). Our marketplace sales data were collected once every 
8 hours and included all used good offers on a given date for each product. The presence of  
XML-based data let us infer the price at which the good was sold, the sale date, all relevant details 
for competing offers of identical products, the number of used goods listed, and the total volume 
of sales for a given product by a given seller on a given day. As we could observe all the unique 
listing IDs and the unique seller IDs for the duration that a product was listed before a sale, we 
could also infer relevant data of all its competitors for any given seller at the time a transaction 
occurred and impute the number of competitors as well as their offer prices, reputation ratings, 
and product conditions at the time of each transaction.  
 Brand Reliability: To check the impact of intrinsic reliability of these brands on used-
good trade patterns, ratings from Consumer Reports, and other auxiliary sources, such as CNET, 
we classify the products a priori by constructing reliability rankings. For instance, within the 
category of digital cameras, Sony and Panasonic have higher reliability ratings while Vivitar and 
Samsung have lower ratings. According to Consumer Reports, these ratings were based on 
186,900 reader responses to the 2005 Annual Questionnaire about digital cameras bought new 
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between 2002 and 2005. Based on these sources, we compute an ordinal reliability ranking for the 
products.4 Table 6 in the Appendix provides a summary of the reliability rankings and 
demonstrates that distinct brands exhibit considerable variation in their intrinsic reliability.  
 Other Controls: A potential factor that might affect differences in turnaround times is 
consumer search costs. On the Internet, heterogeneity in search costs can arise from differences in 
willingness to scroll down the screen (Brynjolfsson et al. 2004). It is possible that consumers find 
it costly to scroll down the screen and observe all offers since this act involves a cognitive cost in 
evaluating multiple listings. Thus, it is plausible that consumers who inspect higher screens only 
and buy accordingly, chose to do so because they might care only about price (Brynjolfsson et al. 
2004). On the other hand, consumers who inspect lower screens might to do so since they care 
about non-price factors, such as product quality and seller characteristics.  
On the Amazon marketplace, this search cost effect is mediated by the fact that even 
though the used good offers are arranged in order of increasing price as one scrolls down the 
screen, higher quality products are displayed on the higher screens and the lower quality 
categories are displayed on the lower screens. Hence, from a consumer’s point of view, there 
appears to be two countervailing effects from quality and price that could alleviate the net impact 
on sale time from the search cost-related factors. Nevertheless, for the sake of robustness, we do 
account for the position of any given used offer on the screen by controlling for it in our empirical 
estimations. Amazon displays up to a maximum of 25 offers on a screen, followed by 25 more 
offers on the next screen and so on. The summary statistics of the variables for each product 
category are presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. Note that secondary datasets are typically more 
objective and have several advantages compared to primary data, including but not limited to, the 
absence of response bias that may be present in primary data. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Time-to-Sale, Product Uncertainty, and Seller Uncertainty 
 To test Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b that examine the impact of product quality and seller 
reputation on sale time, respectively, our dependent variable is the natural log of Sale Time. We 
estimate the following panel data model:  
 0 1 2 3(  ) (  ) (  ) ( )ijt ijt ijt ijtLn Sale Time Ln Sale Price Ln Seller Rating Ln Lifeλ λ λ λ= + + + +  
 4 5( ) ( )ijt ijt ij ijtLn Condition Xλ λ µ ξ+ + +  (1) 
                                                 
4To be precise, we construct an “unreliability ranking” of these products, by simply reversing the order of reliability 
ranking. This coding is done to facilitate easier interpretation of the coefficients in the equation (2).  
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where ,i j , and t  index product, seller, and date, respectively.5 To control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across sellers and products, OLS regressions are estimated with product-seller fixed 
effects. The independent variables are the seller’s reputation rating, the number of ratings (or 
feedback postings) of the seller, the condition of the used product, and a vector of other control 
variables (X). The control variables include the sale price, number of competitors, and the position 
of a used good offer on the screen relative to competing offers. xijt is a product-seller-time 
idiosyncratic error term and mij is a product-seller fixed effect.6 7 Our initial estimates focus on 
numeric feedback scores and ignore all text-based feedback completely. Subsequently, in Section 
4.1.1 we discuss the results with the content analysis of textual feedback. 
 A potential concern in this estimation is that Sale Price can be endogenous. We address 
this using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with Instrument Variables. We first discuss the OLS 
results, and subsequently, in Section 4.1.2, we discuss the 2SLS results.  
Our primary interest for testing H1 lies in the parameter 4λ  which captures the relationship 
between product condition and sale time. The estimates are presented in Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
From Column (2) in these tables, we see that (β = 0.001 and p>0.01 for PDAs, β = 0.035 and 
p<0.001 for digital cameras, β = 0.1 and p<0.001 for audio players, and β = 0.03 and p<0.001 for 
laptops). To summarize across all Columns, the coefficient of Product Condition while positive 
for all four categories, is statistically significant for audio players and laptops in all specifications 
(Columns 1, 2 and 4 in Tables 9 and 10, respectively), and for digital cameras for some 
specifications (Columns 2 and 4 in Table 8). Controlling for price and seller characteristics, such 
as reputation score and number of postings, our analyses implies that an increase in the quality of 
the used good leads to an increase in the sale time of the product in the used-good marketplace in 
three of the four categories. Thus, this test provides support for H1, namely, that higher quality 
goods do take a longer time to sell than lower quality goods in dynamic used-good markets.  
It is useful to note also how these estimates can be interpreted. Given that the range of 
                                                 
5To account for potential non-linearities and smooth large values, we use the log of the independent variables that is 
consistent with the literature (Ba and Pavlou 2002, Ghose et al. 2005). To be precise, because some values of Life are 
equal to zero, we take the logarithm of one plus the values of these variables.  
6 Robust standard errors are used in all regressions to account for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, based on 
the Durbin-Watson test and the Breusch-Pagan test, respectively (Woolridge 2002). 
7 The fixed effects estimator uses variation within observations over time. The basic specification includes 
observations of dependent and independent variables for each product-seller in each cross sectional time period and a 
time invariant vector of characteristics representing unobserved heterogeneity across products and sellers. The 
random effects estimator is a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that is just a matrix-weighted 
average of the between and within estimators where the weighting matrix accounts for correlation across observations 
in the residuals. The fixed effects model does not make the assumption of zero correlation between the regressors and 
the individual specific effects, while the random effects model makes this assumption. The random effects model 
brings efficiency gains and the ability to estimate time invariant covariates at the risk of inconsistency. To test the 
consistency of the random effects estimator, one needs the Hausman test (Woolridge 2002). In our data, the Hausman 
test reveals that fixed effects are appropriate compared to random effects. 
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condition of a used product can vary from 1-6, a 1- point increase in the quality of the used good 
can be a significant percentage increase in product quality. Specifically, a jump in used-good 
quality from 5 to 6 is equivalent to a 20 % increase in used quality, a jump from 4 to 5 is 
equivalent to a 25 % increase in used quality, and so on. A 1-point increase in the log of used 
product condition leads to an increase in the log of sale time ranging from 3% for laptops and 
digital cameras to as much as 14% for audio players.  
We next discuss the tests of H2a and H2b. Column (2) includes the proportion of positive 
and negative feedback for sellers (but excludes the neutral feedback). For all the 4 categories, we 
find that the impact of an increase in the proportion of positive feedback postings (PLife) on sale 
time is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.1 and p<0.001 for PDAs, β = 0.21 and p<0.001 
for digital cameras, β = 0.03 and p<0.001 for audio players, and β = 0.1 and p<0.001 for laptops). 
Similarly, the effect of an increase in the proportion of negative postings (Nlife) is negative and 
statistically significant (β = - 0.06 and p<0.001 for PDAs, β = - 0.1 and p<0.001 for digital 
cameras, β = - 0.04 and p<0.001 for audio players, and β = - 0.07 and p<0.001 for laptops). The 
impact of an increase in seller numeric reputation score on sale time is also positive and 
statistically significant. For example, from Column (2) we can see β = 0.06 and p<0.001 for 
PDAs, β = 0.18 and p<0.001 for digital cameras, β = 0. 39 and p<0.001 for audio players, and β = 
0.79 and p<0.001 for laptops. Further, the marginal effect of an increase in the size of the seller 
(as indicated by the number of transactions that the seller completed) on sale time is always 
positive. These results lend support to H2a and H2b. 
We also estimate a model that includes the interaction of seller reputation with product 
quality to see if the predicted positive association between sale time and higher product quality is 
stronger when the seller has a lower reputation rating. This finding would give a sense of the 
extent of complementarity or substitution between seller-level information and product level-
information. For the first approach, we use dummy variables for both low seller reputation and 
high product condition to capture the interaction effects. Specifically, to code “low reputation 
sellers”, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the seller reputation rating was less than 4. In 
the same fashion, to code “high quality products”, we created a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
product condition score is greater than or equal to 5. We then interact the two dummy variables 
and estimate the model. We still find that higher quality products and higher reputation sellers 
take a longer time to sell, thereby validating H1, H2a, and H2b. The coefficient of the interaction 
term is statistically significant only for the laptop category, while the direct effect of each of the 
two variables is bigger than the interaction term, as seen in Column (3) in Tables 7 through 10. 
The directional nature of these results was robust to different specifications used to capture the 
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interaction effects.8 The results suggest that there is no consistent evidence of complementarity or 
substitution effects for product-level and seller-level information to affect information asymmetry. 
 
4.1.1 Content Analysis of Reputation Profiles 
One could argue that seller reputation rating contains information related to both a seller’s 
service quality and product condition. In such a scenario, it is plausible to increase the precision in 
the empirical estimations by splitting a seller’s reputation rating to reflect the seller and product 
information embedded in that reputation separately. 
  To check for the robustness of analyses, we perform an additional set of analysis by using 
content analysis techniques to parse the buyer-generated textual feedback in the sellers’ reputation 
profiles. User-generated transaction feedback has now proliferated in the reputation systems of 
major online markets, such as Amazon and eBay. It has been shown by an emerging stream of 
research that textual feedback posted by buyers does influence seller’s pricing power and the 
probability of a sale over and above the numeric ratings summarized in the used product 
marketplace (Ghose et al. 2005, 2007). Hence, the qualitative information contained in text-based 
feedback is used here to unravel the two dimensions of reputation contained in the ratings. 
Content analysis is a popular technique in research (e.g., Kolbe and Burnett 1991, Pavlou 
and Dimoka 2006) and is applied to transform the meaning of text comments into objective data, 
using systematic procedures to ensure both objectivity reliability of a data analysis (e.g., Weber 
1990). Toward this goal, feedback text comments are classified as product-condition related if 
they reflect some aspect of product quality. Those comments referring to service quality of the 
seller are classified as seller-service related. We use two human annotators for this study. For 
each of the four product categories in our data, the annotators read the reputation feedback 
postings of all the sellers who made a transaction and identified whether the feedback postings in 
each seller profile contained comments about either or both dimensions. The presence or absence 
of each kind of comment is coded as a dummy (0, 1) variable. The content analysis examines a 
total of 25 comments per seller across the first two pages.9 This method is similar to that used by 
Pavlou and Dimoka (2006), who indicate that buyers typically do not view comments beyond the 
first two pages. See Table A1 in the Appendix for examples of such feedback. 
 Our sampling scheme produced a total of 7, 552 feedback comments coded for content 
analysis (there were some common sellers who overlapped across the product categories) by each 
of the two annotators. To test the reliability of the content analysis, a reliability score is calculated 
                                                 
8 Using an alternate approach, we also ran interaction effects with a continuous measure of one variable and a dummy 
variable for the other. All the results were qualitatively the same as the existing ones. 
9The default number of comments on a single page on Amazon is 25. While the first page of the seller’s profile shows 
5 comments, when the user goes to the second page, it shows a total of 25 comments that include the 5 comments 
shown on the first page. 
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for each of the two categories. We calculate Perrault and Leigh’s (1989) reliability index, wherein 
the authors independently evaluated a sample of the text comments and compare their results with 
those of the coders. This score was 0.92 and 0.88 for seller service-related and product condition-
related feedback, respectively. The values also exceed Perreault and Leigh’s (1989) 
recommendation of 0.8. We also measure the inter-rater agreement across the two coders, using 
the Kappa statistic. This analysis shows substantial agreement with a Kappa of 0.77. All the 
analyses suggest high reliability of our content analysis.  
Thereafter we determine the implicit contribution of seller service-related and product 
condition-related textual feedback to a seller’s overall reputation. To infer the reputation of a 
seller along the seller-related dimension, we divide the sum of the seller’s reputation rating for 
each posting with seller-related information by the frequency of the ‘seller-related’ dummy 
variable across all the postings. This becomes the seller service-related rating variable. Similarly, 
we divide the sum of the seller’s reputation rating for each posting with some product-related 
information by the frequency of the ‘product-related’ dummy variable across all the postings. This 
becomes the product condition-related rating variable. The procedure enables us to apportion the 
magnitude of the effect of these two components on seller reputation score and split the seller 
reputation rating into two components, one that reflects seller service and the second reflecting 
product condition-related information.  
We provide the results from the analysis of this data sample in Column (4) of Tables 7-10. 
The sign on each of the two dimensions of reputation ratings is positive and statistically 
significant, and the estimates for the other variables remain qualitatively unchanged. These 
estimates verify that the main results for H1, H2a and H2b, remain qualitatively the same even if 
we were to apportion seller reputation scores into these two components by incorporating textual 
feedback. 
 
4.1.2 Instrument Variables Estimation With 2SLS 
While Equation (1) can be estimated using a panel data fixed effects model, a concern for 
this strategy is potential endogeneity of sale price. To control for this potential problem, we 
estimate a Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) regression using instrument variables (Woolridge 
2002). Commonly used instruments for prices are not available to us. For example, lack of 
marginal cost data rules out cost-side instruments, and lack of regional data rules out “Hausman”-
style instruments. Due to this limited supply of available instruments, we follow prior work and 
use a one-period, lagged value of listing price as the instrument (Villas-Boas and Winer 1999). 
Admittedly, the lagged price might not be an ideal instrument since it is possible to have common 
demand shocks correlated over time, and then lagged prices would be correlated with the current 
 18
period demand shock. However, common demand shocks correlated through time are similar to 
trends. Hence, a suitable control for correlated demand shocks or trends in the 2SLS equation can 
alleviate these concerns.  
Towards this, we use data on the online search volume of these products. Specifically, we 
use data on the “product search volume” of the different products in our sample from Google 
Trends to control for exogenous demand shocks that may be correlated over time. For each 
product, we retrieve a search volume graph from the Google Trends website. This graph 
represents the number of search queries for a particular product name submitted to Google. We 
then digitize the trend data, using Engauge Digitizer software and use the log of the search 
volume as a proxy variable in the regression, similar to the methods in Archak et al. (2008). These 
results are qualitatively the same and presented in Column (5) of Tables 7-10.10  
These results imply that although there seems to be some time-based, efficient sorting 
going on in used-good markets between sellers of high and low quality products and sellers of 
high and low reputation ratings, the presence of some seller-based and product-based information 
uncertainty creates impediments in the efficient allocation of used goods. Thus, our analysis 
suggests that information asymmetries associated with adverse selection continue to exist in some 
electronic used-good markets. 
4.1.3 Other Robustness Checks  
 It is possible that inexperienced sellers’ used-good offers (where experience is measured 
based on the number of recorded feedback postings) differ from those of experienced sellers in 
some unobservable manner, and these different choices lead to different trade patterns in 
equilibrium. For example, larger sellers who have multiple units of the same product available for 
sale may derive a lower use value from holding on to the used good. While these differences can 
be captured in the product-seller fixed effects, we examine the data in greater detail by stratifying 
it in different ways. Specifically, we create a dummy variable that took the value of 0 or 1, 
depending on whether the seller had between 1 and 100,000 postings or more than 100,000 
postings, respectively. This classification produces two categories of sellers based on the number 
of prior recorded transactions: Small sellers (fewer than 100,000 transactions) and large sellers 
(more than 100,000 transactions). We find that an increase in product condition as well as an 
increase in seller rating and seller feedback postings still positively relates to sale time and is 
statistically significant for all four categories, providing support for H1, H2a, and H2b. These 
results are also very robust to the use of three classes of sellers based again on the number of 
                                                 
10Results are robust to the use of more than one period lag of the used good listing price. Further, regressions of sale 
prices on polynomials in lagged list prices reject serial correlation in residuals that use the Box-Pierce-Lung statistic 
(Ljung and Box, 1978). 
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recorded transactions: Small sellers (fewer than 50,000 transactions), medium sellers (between 
50,000 and 100,000 transactions), and large sellers (more than 100,000 transactions). Finally, it is 
possible that sellers may not derive a residual value from using the highest quality good (“new 
good”) in order not to degrade their qualities and thereby lower the exchange value. Hence, we 
also carried out the entire analysis after excluding the “new” goods in our data. Again, we find 
strong support for H1, H2a and H2b. These results are shown in the Appendix in Tables A1-A4.  
In addition to the above tests, we also experimented with a broad array of other control 
variables, such as (i) Amazon sales rank of the new good to control for the average popularity of 
the product at the time a sale occurred in the used-good market; (ii) the valence and volume of 
reviews received by the product in the new good market at Amazon to control for potential word-
of-mouth effects driving sales; (iii) the manufacturer’s list price for the product; (iv) Amazon’s 
retail price; (v) the number of days since the product was available on the market (which can 
proxy for the average age of the product); (vi) dummy variables for the month to control for 
seasonal variations; and (vii) data on competitor reputation scores and offered product conditions. 
None of these specifications led to any qualitative change in our results, and hence the details are 
omitted for brevity. 
Finally, note that “within R-squared” values of our models ranged between 0.02 and 0.19 
across the four product categories because these R-squared values are for the "within" 
(differenced) fixed-effect estimator that estimates this regression by differencing out average 
values across product sellers. This means that the calculated “within” R-squared values not take 
into account the explanatory power of the fixed effects. If we estimated the fixed effects instead of 
differencing them out, the measured R-squared would be much higher (between 0.66 and 0.88) as 
can be seen from the row titled “R-squared with fixed effects” in Tables 7-10. 
4.2 Price Decline, Trade Volumes, and Reliability 
 Hypotheses 3a and 3b for the relationship between price declines, product reliability, and 
trade volume is a relatively direct test of the presence of adverse selection. As discussed, this test 
is based on an empirical framework similar to that used by Gilligan (2004). The dependent 
variable constructed was the natural log of Price Decline where Price Decline is the ratio of the 
difference between Manufacturer Price (price of the new good) and Sale Price (price of the used 
good) over the Manufacturer Price.11 That is, the price decline measures the extent of the residual 
value of the used product at any given point in time. The higher the residual value, the lower will 
be the price decline. Within each of the four categories, we aggregate products into “models” 
                                                 
11The qualitative nature of our results is robust to the use of Amazon’s retail price for the new good instead of the 
manufacturer’s list price for the new good. 
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based on the make and type of the product.12 Since there are few instances of a seller-model 
combinations sold on a daily level for some products, we aggregate the transactions at a weekly 
level and use ‘week’ as the unit of time to maintain consistency in the analyses across the four 
categories. Similar to Gilligan (2004), we estimate models of the form:  
 0 1 2( ) (  )ijt ijt ijtLn PriceDecline Unreliability Ln Trade Volumeλ λ λ= + + +  
 3 4( (  )) ( )ijt ijt ij ijtUnreliabilty Ln Trade Volume Xλ λ µ ξ∗ + + +  (2) 
where i, j, and t index the model, seller, and time, respectively. X denotes the control variables 
such as Rating, Life, Condition, and Competitors. xijt is an idiosyncratic error term and mij is a 
model-seller fixed effect. The Unreliability variable reflects the extent to which the brand is 
intrinsically not reliable. Thus, higher values of the Unreliability variable indicate lower brand 
reliability. The Trade Volume variable captures the total volume of used goods of a specific model 
sold by a seller in a given week.  
A potential concern in this estimation is that price declines and trading volumes may be 
jointly determined by other factors. Because of possible endogeneity concerns, OLS may produce 
biased estimates of the relationship between trade volume and price decline. We address this 
using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with Instrument Variables. We first discuss the OLS 
results, and then subsequently in Section 4.2.1, we discuss the 2SLS results. 
Our primary interest is in the parameter 2λ , which captures the relationship between trade 
volume and price decline, and in 3λ which captures the interaction effect of unreliability for this 
relationship. However, because both Trade Volume and Unreliability are continuous variables, the 
interaction effect needs to be carefully measured and interpreted.13 
 The estimates for each category are reported in Tables 11-14. A number of interesting 
results emerge from this analysis. First, note from Columns (1) and (2) that the sign on the 
coefficient for Unreliability, 1λ , is positive and statistically significant for digital cameras (β = 
0.33 and p<0.001), PDAs  (β = 0.05 and p<0.001) and laptops (β = 0.042 and p<0.001).  This 
finding implies that there is an indeed a positive relationship between price decline and increased 
                                                 
12 For example, an Apple iPod can have three models associated with it -  the ‘Shuffle’, ‘Nano’, and the ‘Classic’. 
Under this classification, a green, black or purple ‘Shuffle’ all belong to the model ‘iPod Shuffle’. Note that we 
cannot identify parameters of interest when we include product fixed effects since the unreliability rankings are from 
the year 2005 and hence, are correlated with the unique product identifiers in the dataset with no variation over time. 
In an alternate specification, we ran regressions that included product-seller random effects. We found no change in 
the qualitative nature of the main results. 
13We are interested in the regression of Price Decline on Trade Volume at particular values of Unreliability. The 
( 0 1( )λ λ+ Unreliability  term is the simple intercept, and the 2 3( )λ λ+ Unreliability  term is the simple slope. To examine 
the interaction, we must choose particular values of Unreliability at which to compute the slopes. Since it is common 
for researchers to choose the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and the maximum, we conduct our 
analysis accordingly. Further the variables are also mean-centered to enable easier interpretations of the interactions 
and minimize potential problems with multi-collinearity (Aiken and West 1991). 
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unreliability of the product as hypothesized in H3a. The coefficient on the interaction of 
unreliability and trade volume, 3λ , can be interpreted as the amount of change in the slope of the 
regression of Price Decline on Trade Volume when Unreliability changes by one unit. We use the 
relevant numbers from the descriptive statistics, and plug them into the expressions that determine 
the marginal impact of Unreliability on the relationship between Trade Volume and Price 
Decline.  
  All else being equal, we find that for two of the four categories, products with higher 
levels of unreliability, exhibit a more negative relationship between trading volume and price 
decline, thereby supporting H3b. Specifically, do note from Column (2) that the sign on the 
coefficient for the interaction term, 3λ , is positive and statistically significant for digital cameras 
(β = -0.041 and p<0.001) and laptops (β = -0.005 and p<0.001). For PDAs, while there are some 
regions over which price declines grow steeper and volume of trade become lower as the inherent 
unreliability of the product increases, the evidence here is relatively weaker than for the other 
three categories.  
In summary, our analysis reveals that Hypotheses 3a and 3b hold true for several products, 
implying that these products are subject to the adverse selection problem in the online used-good 
market.14 These findings are consistent with the notion that when asymmetric information exists 
in used-good markets, efficient sorting and allocation fails to occur in that market. As postulated 
by Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), the lower volume of trade for used goods can be attributed to 
adverse selection. Note again that as before in Section 4.1, the low “within R-squared” values 
occur because we difference out the fixed effects in our estimations. If we estimated the actual 
dummy variables, the same model would yield significantly higher R-squared values. 
 In summary, this test provides further empirical evidence of the existence of adverse 
selection among a variety of used electronic products in dynamic and decentralized electronic 
used-good markets, such as Amazon, where there is a continuous entry and exit by buyers and 
sellers. While we are able to shed light on how these products exhibit differences in trading 
patterns, inferring the exact cause of those differences is not possible from our data. It is possible 
that used audio players display more homogeneity- and commodity- like features than do used 
PDAs, digital cameras, and laptops.  This aspect could mitigate information uncertainties in the 
minds of consumers. It is also possible that these particular products are relatively less expensive 
than those in the other three categories, and this variation might play a role in determining the 
extent of purchase involvement in a market with information asymmetry (Pavlou et al. 2006). 
                                                 
14We conducted the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) test for all regression models and found no evidence of multi-
collinearity among the independent variables. The VIF scores for all variables are lower than the commonly accepted 
level of 10 (Kennedy 2003). 
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4.2.1 Instrument Variables Estimation With 2SLS 
In models of trade for used durable goods, price declines and trading volumes may be jointly 
determined by such factors as distribution of buyers tastes, rates of durable good quality 
depreciation, and realizations of used-good quality (Gilligan 2004). Because of possible 
endogeneity concerns, OLS may produce biased estimates of the relationship between trade 
volume and price decline. To better evaluate that relationship, we estimate a Two-Stage Least 
Square (2SLS) regression using instrument variables. As before, we are stymied by the limited 
supply of available instruments. We exploit the panel dimension of the data and use lagged values 
of explanatory variables as an instrument, consistent with prior work (Villas-Boas and Winer 
1999). If there is sufficient variation over time in the lagged independent variable, then there is 
less likely to be correlations amongst common errors and hence they are more likely to be suitable 
instruments (Villas-Boas and Winer 1999). This choice does not lead to any qualitative change in 
the results as can be seen from Columns (3) and (4) in Tables 11-14. It should be noted however 
that if the lagged independent variable is correlated with current period shocks, then the 2SLS 
model will underestimate the true effect of trade volume. As a robustness check, we also 
experiment with a broad array of other control variables, such as the average review rating for the 
new good, competitors’ reputation ratings, and the condition of their products. These controls did 
not affect the qualitative nature of the results, thus finding support for H3a and H3b.  
4.2.2  GMM Estimation 
 It is possible that the price decline in the current period is affected by the extent of price 
decline in the previous period. For example, sellers’ choices regarding the listing price that affect 
the volume of trade in previous periods could potentially affect the sale price in the current period. 
Hence, we estimate a dynamic panel data estimator, such as the Arellano-Bond estimator with 
lagged dependent variables (lagged value of Price Decline) on the right hand side of equation 
(2).15 A potential difficulty with the DGMM estimator is that lagged levels may not be good 
instruments for first differences when the underlying variables are highly persistent over time. 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) propose an augmented estimator 
commonly referred to as “system GMM” (SGMM), in which the original equations in levels are 
added to the system. The idea is to instrument differences with lagged levels and instrument levels 
                                                 
15Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized Method of Moments estimator that treats the model as a system 
of equations, one for each time period. The equations differ only in their instrument/moment condition sets. The key 
idea is that if the error terms are serially uncorrelated, then the lagged values of the dependent variable and the 
endogeneous variable represent valid instruments. The resulting estimator is known as the “difference GMM” 
(DGMM).  
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with lagged differences. We use this approach and apply the finite-sample correction proposed by 
Windmeijer (2005) which corrects for the two-step covariance matrix and increases the efficiency 
of both GMM estimators. We include time dummies to ensure that the assumption about no 
correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances required for the autocorrelation test 
and robust estimates of the standard errors holds (Roodman 2006). The Hansen J-test suggests 
that the instruments as a group are exogenous. As seen from Column (5) of Tables 11-14, the 
estimates suggest that our results are robust, thus finding support for H3a and H3b. 
5. DISCUSSION  
5.1 Key Findings and Contributions 
The paper offers several findings validated in two distinct, empirical analyses with panel 
data on four different product categories (PDAs, digital cameras, laptops, and audio players). 
First, this study analyzes the impact of information asymmetry on trade patterns when market 
failure is reflected in the length of waiting time before a seller is able to execute a trade in the 
secondary market, after controlling for price and other factors. The adverse selection problem 
exists as it takes time to separate high and low quality products, and higher quality products do 
take a longer time to sell than lower quality goods. The gains from eventual trading are offset by 
this waiting cost, and it is well-known that time preferences can play a critical role in determining 
the net social surplus (Janssen and Roy 2004). We find that despite the presence of quality 
indicators, such as seller-disclosed product condition and buyer-generated reputation feedback, 
the adverse selection problem is not completely alleviated in online used-good markets. Thus, this 
paper corroborates predictions based on recent theory on dynamic and decentralized markets 
where goods of varying quality are available for sale by sellers of varying reputation. This 
research is the first empirical study that considers time as a dimension for efficient sorting in 
online markets, thereby extending the prior work that looked at determinants for the duration of 
ownership to examine the presence of asymmetric information in offline markets (Sirmans et al. 
1995, Nagler and Osgood 2006).   
 Second, the paper examines the inter-relationship between product reliability, trade 
volumes, and price depreciation. It provides direct evidence of the existence of the lemon problem 
based on this relationship as theorized by Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), and then shown by Gilligan 
(2004). By empirically demonstrating an inverse relationship between steeper price declines and 
lower volumes of trade and showing that this relationship is stronger for less reliable brands, this 
paper offers evidence of the presence of quality-based information asymmetry for digital cameras, 
PDAs, laptops and audio players in electronic markets. This is the first paper that uses this test of 
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adverse selection in an online context, thereby extending the work of Gilligan (2004) who has 
demonstrated adverse selection in offline markets for used business aircraft using the same 
framework. 
 How do these findings extend the prior work and contribute to the literature? Prior 
theoretical research on adverse selection shows that when there is information asymmetry in static 
markets, higher quality goods are less likely to be traded despite the potential gains from that 
trade. However, empirical evidence of this theory has been found to be mixed in both offline 
markets and more recently in online markets even within the same category -- that of used cars 
(Fabel and Lehmann 2000, Garicano and Kaplan 2001, Emons and Sheldon 2002, Adams et al. 
2005, Wolf and Muhanna 2006, Overby 2008). Much of the prior empirical analyses are based on 
testable predictions from models that considered static markets. Online markets exhibit more 
dynamic characteristics due to the entry and exit of buyers and sellers.  
Recently, a few theoretical papers have shown that in dynamic used-good markets with 
entry of traders, the inefficiencies caused by information uncertainty can manifest themselves as 
temporal effects in various trading patterns (Janssen and Karamychev 2002, Blouin 2003, Janssen 
and Roy 2004) and price dynamics (Hendel and Lizzeri 1999, Gilligan 2004). However, no work 
to date has tested for clear empirical evidence of information asymmetry in electronic markets 
based on predictions from these dynamic models. This motivates the need to test and quantify the 
effects of information asymmetry in markets by drawing on predictions where time can be used as 
a sorting mechanism in addition to price. Our paper bridges this limitation to address a 
managerially relevant problem. 
Further, other than Dimoka and Pavlou (2008), prior work has subsumed product 
uncertainty within seller uncertainty without explicitly defining them as two separate constructs. 
However, because of changes in both product and seller characteristics over a given period of 
time, information uncertainty can arise from both sources. This is particularly true in electronic 
markets where buyers and sellers are separated by time and space, and product quality signals 
may not be easily conveyed by sellers. This paper distinguishes between product- and seller- 
induced information uncertainty, and separately measures the impact of each. We thus extend the 
literature on seller reputation theories (for example, Klein and Leffler 1981) by analyzing the role 
of product information in affecting information asymmetry. We do not find any consistent 
evidence of substitution or complementarity effects between product-level information and seller-
level information in alleviating information uncertainty. In this regard, our paper particularly 
differs from the extant work that finds either substitution (Anand and Shachar 2004) or 
complementarity (Dimoka and Pavlou 2008) effects between the two constructs.  
 A third feature of much of the prior work on adverse selection in electronic markets is that 
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it all has been done in the context of auctions where final sale prices are primarily determined by 
buyers’ valuations and bidding behavior (Dewan and Hsu 2004, Adams et al. 2005, Wolf and 
Muhanna 2006) rather than in posted price markets, such as online used-good markets where the 
starting and ending prices are primarily determined by sellers. Hence, our understanding of how 
information uncertainty affects dynamics in posted price markets is still nascent. A deeper 
understanding of the price decline process can create appropriate incentives for sellers to price the 
used good accordingly, especially when simultaneously selling new goods.  In this vein, our paper 
contributes to the literature examining interactions between new and used good markets and its 
impact on seller profitability (Aron and Sundararajan 1998, Ghose et al. 2005, 2006, 2007). 
5.2 Implications for Practice 
 Our paper demonstrates that despite the presence of reputation systems that contain user-
generated feedback on sellers’ transaction history, online used-good markets remain susceptible to 
certain adverse selection problems. While seller ratings have been used to measure reputation 
effects in prior work (Dellarocas 2003), the role of these systems in influencing market 
mechanism design is only just emerging, as noted by Bapna et al. (2004) in the context of online 
auctions and Ghose et al. (2005, 2007) in the context of posted price markets. It is well known 
that asymmetric information can produce negative effects on the level of welfare generated by a 
market. Our paper provides a descriptive analysis of the temporal nature of the various effects, a 
finding that can be used to make prescriptive managerial recommendations on market design to 
enhance social welfare and consumer surplus (Ghose et al. 2006, Bapna et al. 2008). 
  The existence of adverse selection has interesting implications for merchants who are 
contemplating trading on electronic markets and also for intermediaries who host these markets. 
An ongoing concern is whether sellers may misrepresent the true quality of the used good. Since 
information uncertainty affects higher quality sellers more than others, market makers can invest 
in tools that do a better job in communicating reliable product information to buyers. Product 
diagnosticity allows buyers to accurately evaluate a product’s quality (Jiang and Benbasat 2007). 
Since accurate disclosure of product condition tends to affect both sale time and trade volume, 
market makers could benefit from newer mechanisms that enable sellers to reveal information 
about the true quality of the used products. This could include information on the number of 
repairs, the use of extended warranties, or the vintage record of the product, i.e., the number of 
distinct consumers who have used it in the past and the duration of their ownership. Hendel and 
Lizzeri (2005) have shown that it is possible to employ the vintage of the used good to signal its 
quality and lead to efficient sorting in used good markets. Reputation systems could also place 
higher weightage on more recent transactions since it has been shown that under such a 
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mechanism, the optimal strategy of a high quality seller is to always advertise honestly (Aperjis 
and Johari 2008). This is consistent with eBay's recent decision to base the Positive Feedback 
percentage on the past 12 months of feedback, rather than the entire lifetime of the seller. 
       Our analysis of user-generated reputation feedback suggests that buyers do consider the 
textual content posted in the reputation profiles of sellers before making a purchase decision. To 
the extent that information extracted from user-generated textual feedback and displayed in a 
user-friendly manner can facilitate increased trust between buyers and sellers, our study 
demonstrates the need for designing more robust reputation systems that explicitly display several 
dimensions of a seller’s reputation such as customer service, packaging, shipping, product 
representation, etc. Websites can use drop-down menus to highlight sellers’ scores for these 
dimensions (Ghose et al. 2005, Ghose et al. 2007, Pavlou and Dimoka 2006), customized by 
product category. Such seller and product diagnostic features on websites can go a long way 
toward mitigating the information asymmetry problem in online used-good markets. 
 The analysis of sale time and its relationship to various product and seller characteristics 
enables a prediction of future demand from sale price information. Basically, sellers can learn 
demand patterns from the final price of current transactions and then bolster future profits by 
procuring the good only in periods of high demand. This information will allow merchants to 
optimize product assortment decisions and minimize costs of inventory for slow-moving products. 
This seems important in an online used-good market where sellers can differ widely based on 
inventory size and homogeneity. 
5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Our paper has several limitations that, nevertheless, create opportunities for future 
research. For example, it is possible that some vendors cross-list the same product across multiple 
websites. We cannot infer whether vendors in our dataset engaged in such practices. However, 
this circumstance would not bias our results as long as sellers did not systematically remove 
listings in the absence of a sale. There is no particular reason to believe that sellers on Amazon 
engage in such practices and so this is not a big concern in our paper. However, if this activity 
were to have occurred in our data, it would have led to an overestimation of the actual number of 
sales. Accounting for this information is then likely to increase the average sale times. Thus, this 
would further reinforce the presence of adverse selection in the market. Future work can use 
transaction data from a pool of common sellers across these markets (for example, sellers who sell 
on both Amazon and eBay) to verify the robustness of our results. 
 Future work can also examine whether the extent of adverse selection varies in different 
markets by comparing lower purchase involvement products (e.g. books, CDs) to higher purchase 
involvement products. The scope of information uncertainty was restricted in this study to seller 
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and product quality aspects, excluding uncertainty sources due to third parties, such as online 
certification intermediaries that are common in certain categories like the used car market. Future 
work can attempt to broaden the scope of uncertainties and examine their effects. While our 
content analysis did demonstrate robustness of the qualitative nature of our results, future research 
can further use automated text-mining methods (Ghose et al. 2005, Ghose et al. 2007, Archak et 
al. 2008, Ghose and Ipeirotis 2008) to more precisely examine the value of textual feedback in 
mitigating adverse selection. 
 We did not have information on the actual product descriptions of the used goods 
provided by sellers in the marketplace. Sellers in online markets use a variety of textual phrases 
such as “brand new, “pristine condition”, “not highlighted”, etc, to describe the condition of the 
used good. Thus, the information on product quality captured in this study may be some function 
of the true quality (strategically chosen, for example, in a disclosure model). While our product-
seller fixed effects do alleviate this concern, especially if it were systematic, future research could 
examine this in greater detail. In fact, future work could incorporate seller-generated textual 
product descriptions to examine their effect over and beyond the numeric scores on product 
description used in this study. Since text reduces uncertainty, there could be strategic causal 
effects of information provision by sellers (Lewis 2007).  
A number of other research developments are possible as extensions of this research. 
Since sellers of higher quality products need to wait longer than their competitors who sell lower 
quality products, they incur a cost of waiting to trade. Indeed, this cost of waiting is an important 
factor that must be considered in any estimation of welfare loss caused by adverse selection 
(Janssen and Roy 2004). Because of the potential inefficiencies from asymmetric information, an 
interesting extension of this study would involve investigating the cost of waiting for different 
sellers and the associated welfare changes not considered in prior work on quantifying welfare 
generated in Internet exchanges for used goods (Ghose et al. 2006, Bapna et al. 2008). In the long 
term, the introduction of other factors, such as product diagnostic tools by online markets, can 
alleviate the information asymmetry problem and lead to entry by more highly reputed sellers. An 
examination of the long- term impact of adverse selection in online markets will require a much 
longer time-series dataset, preferably spanning a few years. 
The kind of data available from online used-good markets allows close  study of  the 
concepts of price-evolution and associated with that topic, various concepts of pricing dynamics 
that are similar to an emerging stream of work in online auctions (Bapna et al. 2005). An 
understanding of these dynamics can be helpful in characterizing demand and predicting the 
probability of a sale in a market made up of heterogeneous sellers selling diverse products. An 
analysis of pricing cycles in used-good markets can have important implications for market 
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mechanism and incentive design. 
From the perspective of future research in e-commerce, our findings suggest opportunities 
for design science research to extract information from the growing volume of user-generated 
content in online markets. These kinds of content can allow market makers to come up with a 
more judicious design of decision-making tools for such systems. Examples could be tools that 
enable multi-media, visual, and textual descriptions of products by sellers (Lewis 2007, Dimoka 
and Pavlou 2008). Further, by showing that current mechanisms for product condition disclosures 
have yet to alleviate the information asymmetry problem, this paper further highlights the role of 
product-level uncertainty as an emerging IS research area (Dimoka and Pavlou 2008). This would 
extend the long stream of research that analyzes the role of seller information signals in reducing 
seller level uncertainty in online markets. From a research perspective, the evaluation of such 
recommended design features, such as drop-down menus that explicitly highlight different 
dimensions of sellers’ reputation and mechanisms and incentives for truthful revelations of actual 
product quality, can be accomplished through well-designed laboratory experiments and eye-
tracking studies. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper theorizes and empirically estimates models that assess information 
uncertainties in Internet exchanges for used goods. Using a unique dataset collected from four 
different categories in the used-good marketplace on Amazon, we investigate trade patterns in a 
competitive electronic market and conduct two tests to demonstrate the presence of adverse 
selection. Akerlof (1970) suggests that mechanisms, such a branding or reputation, may mitigate 
the lemons problem in used-good markets. This paper documents and sheds light on the role of 
seller service and product quality-induced information uncertainty in creating adverse selection 
despite the existence of reputation systems and product condition disclosures in online, used-good 
markets. Our findings suggest a need for improving the design of Internet exchanges for used 
goods to incorporate product diagnostic features that may further mitigate the extent of 
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Manufacturer Price Manufacturer’s price for a new product on Amazon’s new good market. 
Sale Price Final list price at which the used-good transaction occurred  
Condition  Product condition as listed by the seller ranging from 1(lowest condition) to 6 (highest condition).   
Seller Rating Seller’s average numeric reputations score ranging from 1(lowest rating) to 5 (highest rating). 
Life The total number of lifetime ratings the seller has received. 
Competitors Number of competing offers at any given time for a product. 
Sale Time Number of days it took for a product to be sold after being listed.  
Trade Volume Number of used goods of a given product sold by a seller per week. 
Unreliability Brand unreliability rankings imputed from Consumer Reports. 
Offer Position Position of the used-good offer on the screen ranging from 1 to 25. 
PLife The proportion of positive ratings the seller has received. 
NLife The proportion of negative ratings the seller has received. 
Seller Service Related 
Rating 




Dummy indicating whether the feedback had comments about the 
product condition. 
High Condition Dummy indicating a product with condition equal to 5 and above. 
Low Reputation Dummy indicating a seller with average numeric reputation less than 4. 
Price Decline Ratio of difference between the new good price and the used good price (sale price) to the new good price. 




Variable  Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max  
Manufacturer Price  78287 599.59  245.03 29.61  549.99 2298.99   
Sale Price  78287  262.56  161.32  0.99  229.99 1049.99   
Condition  78287  5.09  1.3  1  5 6   
Seller Rating   66076  4.46  0.5  1  4.5 5   
Life  66076  1232.66  11402.77  1  113 261610   
Competitors  78287  11.65 7.48  1  11 26 
Sale Time  78287  13.21  1.58  6  10 11   
Trade Volume  78287  0.479 0.303 1 1 3 
Unreliability  78287  5.8  2.27  1  7 9   
Price Decline 78287 0.52 0.29 0 0.54 0.99 
Offer Position 78287 12.48 1.54 1 12 15 
PLife 66076  86.24 15.12 1 89 100 
NLife 66076  10.13 12.68 1 8 100 
High Condition 78072 0.75 0.43 0 1 1 
Low Reputation 66076 0.036 0.19 0 0 1 
Trend 78287 4.26 0.19 2.39 2.95 4.45 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for PDAs. The column entitled “Observations” includes all seller-
competitor pairs at the time of a transaction. The total number of actual transactions across all sellers in the 
dataset was 11708. Note that some sellers who were new to the market did not have any reputation score 





Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Median Max    
Manufacturer Price  163292  1351.52 1068.84 82.78  1007.71 7999.99   
Sale Price   163292 415.14 328.89 0.88 349.99 7999.99   
Condition  163292  5.74  0.84  1  6 6   
Seller Rating   135030  4.42  0.42  1  4.4 5   
Life  135030  2082.85  13180.22  1  112 261565   
Competitors  163292  18.97 10.65  1  18 40   
Sale Time  163292  13.18  1.68  8  11 12   
Trade Volume  163292  0.578  0.458  1 1 3 
Unreliability  163292  6.1  1.6  1  7 9   
Price Decline 163292 0.59 0.28 0 0.64 0.99 
Offer Position  163292 4.5 2.68 1 4 9 
PLife 135030  83.51 13.3 1 82 100 
NLife 135030  13.43 37.96 1 14 3985 
High Condition 163292 0.94 0.23 0 1 1 
Low Reputation 135030 0.03 0.17 0 0 1 
Trend 163292 4.31 0.21 2.14 3.15 4.54 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for digital cameras. The column entitled “Observations” includes all seller-
competitor pairs at the time of a transaction. The total number of actual transactions across all sellers in the 
dataset was 14172. Note that some sellers who were new to the market did not have any reputation score 





Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Median Max    
Manufacturer Price  67910  467.61 207.45 35.02 329.49 499.95   
Sale Price   67910 162.93  126.96  1 140.8 499.95   
Condition  67910  5.62  0.99  1  6 6   
Seller Rating   62017 4.46  0.44  1  4.5 5   
Life  62017  1310.58  8836.42  1  138 277616   
Competitors  67910  18.78 11.08 1  13 41 
Sale Time  67910  13.47  1.59  5  9 11   
Trade Volume  67910  1.01  0.91  1  1 3 
Unreliability  67910  2.45 1.45 1 2 6  
Price Decline  67910 0.67 0.28 0 0.77 0.99 
Offer Position 67910 4.451 2.56 1 4 9 
PLife 62017 84.19 14.33 1 72 100 
NLife 62017  12.52 13.47 1 22 100 
High Condition 67910          0.93 0.25 0 1 1 
Low Reputation 62017 0.03 0.18 0 0 1 
Trend 67910 4.12 0.29 2.59 3.15 4.65 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for audio players. The column entitled “Observations” includes all seller-
competitor pairs at the time of a transaction. The total number of actual transactions across all sellers in the 
dataset was 14463. Note that some sellers who were new to the market did not have any reputation score 




Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Median  Max    
Manufacturer Price  105350  1486.73 617.96 649.99 74.88 1999.99   
Sale Price   105350 988.87 397.89 502.57 9.24 1999.99   
Condition  105350  4.36  1.33  1  3 6   
Seller Rating   101971  4.7  0.23  2.7  4.7 5   
Life  101971  6209  16025.72  1  2147 272044   
Competitors  105350  6.16 3.53 1  3 15 
Sale Time  105350  12.71  1.88  10  12 16   
Trade Volume  105350  0.97 0.72 1  1 2   
Unreliability  105350  6.62  1.74  1  5 9   
Price Decline 105350 0.968 0.11 0 0.87 0.99 
Offer Position 105350 11.378 0.573 1 11 12 
PLife 101971  92.74 7.88 1 82 100 
NLife 101971  4.76 6.06 1 5 100 
High Condition 105350 0.374 0.48 0 0 1 
Low Reputation 101971 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 
Trend 105350 4.36 0.22 2.51 2.95 4.84
Table 5:  Descriptive statistics for laptops. The column entitled “Observations” includes all seller-
competitor pairs at the time of a transaction. The total number of actual transactions across all sellers in the 
dataset was 18676. Note that some sellers who were new to the market did not have any reputation score 
which is reflected in fewer observations for the seller reputation related variables. 
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Rank Audio Players Digital Cameras Laptops PDAs 
1 Sony Sony Apple Palm 
2 Panasonic Panasonic IBM Asus 
3 Apple Canon Toshiba HP 
4 Phillips Kodak Dell Dell 
5 Toshiba Minolta Gateway Sony 
6 Other Brands Toshiba HP Garmin 
7  Vivitar Compaq Toshiba 
8  Samsung Sony Sharp 
9  Other Brands Other Brands  Other Brands 
 
Table 6: Reliability ranks for different brands in the dataset. These rankings are based directly on the 



































Effect of Seller and Product Characteristics on Sale Time for PDAs ( N = 11708) 
 OLS 2SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log[Sale Price] 0.01** (.0004) 0.014**(0.004) 0.015**(0.004) 0.025**(0.01) 0.035**(0.016) 
Log[Seller Rating] 0.16***(0.01) 0.06***(0.02)    
Log[Life] 0.09***(0.001)  0.1***(0.001) 0.16***(0.001) 0.16***(0.001) 
Log[PLife]  0.1***(0.01)    
Log[NLife]  -0.06***(0.01)    
Log[Condition] 0.01(0.01) 0.001(0.001)  0.003(0.002) 0.004(0.003) 
Log[Competitors] -0.002(0.003) -0.002(0.003) -0.0025(0.003) -0.003(0.003) -0.005(0.005) 
Log[Offer Position] -0.006***(0.0001) -0.005***(0.0001) -0.005***(0.0001) -0.004***(0.0001) -0.005***(0.0002) 
High Condition   0.25(0.2)   
Low Reputation   -0.55***(0.12)   
High Condition x Low Reputation   0.5(0.3)   
Log[Seller Service Related Rating]    0.43***(0.01) 0.55***(0.02) 
Log[Product Condition Related Rating]    0.1***(0.01) 0.12***(0.02) 
Trend     0.075(0.1) 
R 2 (within) 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 
R 2 (with Fixed Effects) 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.74  
 
Table 7: The dependent variable is Log of Sale Time. All models use OLS with product-seller fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** and 
** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Column (2) splits the Life variable into positives and negative. Column (3) shows the interaction effect 
between high condition and low reputation.  Column (4) splits the seller rating variable into two components of seller service related rating and product 
condition related rating based on the content analysis. Column (5) uses 2SLS to instrument for sale price using lagged values of the same variable and search 
volume data from ‘Google Trends’ to control for correlated demand shocks. 
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Effect of Seller and Product Characteristics on Sale Time for Digital Cameras ( N = 14172) 
 OLS 2SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log[Sale Price] 0.023***(0.006) 0.011***(0.004) 0.024***(0.006) 0.03***(0.006) 0.044***(0.01) 
Log[Seller Rating] 0.18***(0.007) 0.18***(0.007)    
Log[Life] 0.51***(0.02)  0.5***(0.02) 0.6***(0.02) 0.72***(0.04) 
Log[PLife]  0.21***(0.01)    
Log[NLife]  -0.1***(0.01)    
Log[Condition] 0.04(0.024) 0.035***(0.01)  0.03***(0.01) 0.044***(0.02) 
Log[Competitors] -0.01***(.001) -0.01***(0.001) -0.01***(0.001) -0.015***(0.001) -0.02***(0.002) 
Log[Offer Position] -0.004***(0.0001) -0.006***(0.0001) -0.005***(0.0001) -0.005***(0.0001) -0.006***(0.0001) 
High Condition   0.15(0.1)   
Low Reputation   -0.6***(0.21)   
High Condition xLow Reputation   0.2 (0.15)   
Log[Seller Service Related Rating]    0.35***(0.01) 0.52***(0.02) 
Log[Product Condition Related Rating]    0.12***(0.01) 0.17***(0.02) 
Trend     0.05(0.1) 
R 2 (within) 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 
R 2 (with Fixed Effects) 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.86  
 
Table 8: The dependent variable is Log of Sale Time. All models use OLS with product-seller fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** and 
** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Column (2) splits the Life variable into positives and negative. Column (3) shows the interaction effect 
between high condition and low reputation.  Column (4) splits the seller rating variable into two components of seller service related rating and product 
condition related rating based on the content analysis. Column (5) uses 2SLS to instrument for sale price using lagged values of the same variable and search 
volume data from ‘Google Trends’ to control for correlated demand shocks. 
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 Effect of Seller and Product Characteristics on Sale Time for Audio Players (N =14463)  
 OLS 2SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log[Sale Price] 0.24***(0.01) 0.25***(0.01) 0.18***(0.01) 0.32***(0.01) 0.47***(0.02) 
Log[Seller Rating] 0.28***(0.007) 0.39***(0.013)    
Log[Life] 0.04***(0.002)  0.03***(0.002) 0.052***(0.002) 0.07***(0.003) 
Log[PLife]  0.03***(0.001)    
Log[NLife]  -0.04***(0.001)    
Log[Condition] 0.11***(0.01) 0.1***(0.001)  0.14***(0.01) 0.23***(0.02) 
Log[Competitors] -0.002***(0.0002) -0.002***(0.0002) -0.002***(0.0002) -0.002***(0.0002) -0.003***(0.0003) 
Log[Offer Position] -0.003***(0.0001) -0.002***(0.0001) -0.003***(0.0001) -0.004***(0.0001) -0.004***(0.0002) 
High Condition   0.92***(0.11)   
Low Reputation   -0.56***(0.12)   
High Condition xLow Reputation   0.04 (0.1)   
Log[Seller Service Related Rating]    0.33***(0.007) 0.51***(0.018) 
Log[Product Condition Related Rating]    0.05***(0.01) 0.064***(0.015) 
Trend     0.08(0.12) 
R 2 (within) 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 
R 2 (with Fixed Effects) 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.87  
 
Table 9:  The dependent variable is Log of Sale Time. All models use OLS with product-seller fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** and 
** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Column (2) splits the Life variable into positives and negative. Column (3) shows the interaction effect 
between high condition and low reputation.  Column (4) splits the seller rating variable into two components of seller service related rating and product 
condition related rating based on the content analysis. Column (5) uses 2SLS to instrument for sale price using lagged values of the same variable and search 




 Effect of Seller and Product Characteristics on Sale Time for Laptops ( N = 18676)  
 OLS 2SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log[Sale Price] 0.03***(0.001) 0.01***(0.001) 0.03***(0.001) 0.045***(0.001) 0.066***(0.002) 
Log[Seller Rating] 0.72***(0.01) 0.79***(0.01)    
Log[Life] 0.1***(0.001)  0.11***(0.001) 0.21***(0.001) 0.28***(0.001) 
Log[PLife]  0.1***(0.001)    
Log[NLife]  -0.07***(0.001)    
Log[Condition] 0.03***(0.001) 0.03***(0.001)  0.035***(0.001) 0.048***(0.002) 
Log[Competitors] 0.0006**(0.0003) 0.001**(0.0003) 0.0006**(0.0003) 0.001***(0.0003) 0.001***(0.0005) 
Log[Offer Position] -0.001***(0.0001) -0.001***(0.0001) -0.001***(0.0001) -0.001***(0.0001) -0.001***(0.0002) 
High Condition   0.5***(0.01)   
Low Reputation   - 0.16***(0.1)   
High Condition x Low Reputation   0.06***(0.01)   
Log[Seller Service Related Rating]    0.81***(0.01) 1.15***(0.02) 
Log[Product Condition Related Rating]    0.3***(0.01) 0.42***(0.02) 
Trend     0.09 (0.115) 
R 2 (within) 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 
R 2 (with Fixed Effects) 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.88  
 
Table 10:  The dependent variable is Log of Sale Time. All models use OLS with product-seller fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** 
and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Column (2) splits the Life variable into positives and negative. Column (3) shows the interaction effect 
between high condition and low reputation.  Column (4) splits the seller rating variable into two components of seller service related rating and product 
condition related rating based on the content analysis. Column (5) uses 2SLS to instrument for sale price using lagged values of the same variable and search 
volume data from ‘Google Trends’ to control for correlated demand shocks.
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Relationship Between Trade Volume, Unreliability and Price Decline for Digital Cameras (N = 472) 
 
 OLS 2SLS GMM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log[Competitors] 0.01***(0.001) 0.012***(0.001) 0.01***(0.002) 0.012***(0.002) 0.01***(0.001) 
Log[Rating] -0.44***(0.02) -0.44***(0.02) -0.53***(0.043) -0.53***(0.043) -0.35***(0.014) 
Log[Life] -0.025***(0.006) -0.025***(0.006) -0.03***(0.011) -0.025***(0.011) -0.02***(0.006) 
Log[Condition] -0.035***(0.01) -0.035***(0.01) -0.048***(0.021) -0.048***(0.021) -0.025***(0.01) 
Log[Trade Volume] -0.125***(0.01) -0.13***(0.01) -0.18***(0.025) -0.18***(0.025) -0.1***(0.01) 
Unreliability 0.33***(0.01) 0.35***(0.01) 0.42***(0.015) 0.45***(0.015) 0.27***(0.01) 
Log[TradeVolume]*Unreliability  -0.041***(0.001)  -0.053***(0.002) -0.034***(0.001) 
Lagged Price Decline     0.72***(0.21) 
Constant -2.2***(0.1) -2.45***(0.08) -2.6***(0.1) -2.85***(0.1) -1.05***(0.1) 
R 2 (within) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  
 
Table 11: The dependent variable is Log of Price Decline. Estimates in columns (1) and (2) are based on OLS with model-seller fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis.  ***  and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) use 2SLS to instrument for trade volume using 
lagged values of the same variable.  
Column (5) uses the efficient system GMM estimator based on the Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) specifications. Standard errors are corrected 
using the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005).  Time dummies are included. The Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions confirms 
the validity of the instruments since the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The Arellano-Bond test, AR (2) in differences shows no second-order serial 
correlation in errors. 
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Relationship Between Trade Volume, Unreliability and Price Decline for PDAs (N = 292)  
 
 OLS 2SLS GMM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log[Competitors] 0.02***(0.003) 0.02***(0.003) 0.02***(0.005) 0.02***(0.005) 0.016***(0.003) 
Log[Rating] -0.51***(0.16) -0.51***(0.16) -0.64***(0.26) -0.64***(0.26) -0.42**(0.16) 
Log[Life] 0.1***(0.02) 0.1***(0.02) 0.15***(0.042) 0.15***(0.042) 0.07***(0.03) 
Log[Condition] -0.04***(0.01) -0.04***(0.01) -0.055***(0.015) -0.055***(0.015) -0.04***(0.01) 
Log[Trade Volume] -0.08***(0.02) -0.078***(0.02) -0.11***(0.033) -0.11***(0.033) -0.05***(0.02) 
Unreliability 0.05***(0.021) 0.055***(0.022) 0.062***(0.021) 0.066***(0.022) 0.035***(0.01) 
Log[TradeVolume]*Unreliability  0.001(0.002)  0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.002) 
Lagged Price Decline     0.64***(0.26) 
Constant -6.1***(0.3) -7.4***(0.28) -4.5***(0.3) -5.1***(0.28) -6.9***(0.3) 
R 2 (within) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  
 
Table 12: The dependent variable is Log of Price Decline. Estimates in columns (1) and (2) are based on OLS with model-seller fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis.  ***  and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) use 2SLS to instrument for trade volume using 
lagged values of the same variable.  
Column (5) uses the efficient system GMM estimator based on the Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) specifications. Standard errors are corrected 
using the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005).  Time dummies are included. The Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions confirms 
the validity of the instruments since the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The Arellano-Bond test, AR (2) in differences shows no second-order serial 




Relationship Between Trade Volume, Unreliability and Price Decline for Audio Players (N =481) 
 
 OLS 2SLS GMM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log[Competitors] 0.01***(0.001) 0.01***(0.001) 0.014***(0.001) 0.014***(0.001) 0.007***(0.001) 
Log[Rating] -0.05***(0.01) -0.05***(0.01) -0.072***(0.02) -0.072***(0.02) -0.04***(0.01) 
Log[Life] -0.02***(0.001) -0.02***(0.001) -0.033***(0.002) -0.033***(0.002) -0.017***(0.001) 
Log[Condition] -0.01***(0.001) -0.01***(0.001) -0.014***(0.0015) -0.014***(0.0015) -0.008***(0.001) 
Log[Trade Volume] -0.02***(0.001) -0.02***(0.001) -0.025***(0.002) -0.025***(0.002) -0.01***(0.001) 
Unreliability -0.025***(0.002) -0.03***(0.002) -0.031***(0.003) -0.038***(0.003) -0.016***(0.002) 
Log[TradeVolume]*Unreliability  0.04***(0.001)  0.055***(0.002) 0.028***(0.001) 
Lagged Price Decline     0.12***(0.1) 
Constant 0.85***(0.1) 0.5***(0.1) 1.185***(0.22) 1.15***(0.2) 0.65***(0.1) 
R 2 (within) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  
 
Table 13: The dependent variable is Log of Price Decline. Estimates in columns (1) and (2) are based on OLS with model-seller fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis.  ***  and ** denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) use 2SLS to instrument for trade volume using 
lagged values of the same variable.  
Column (5) uses the efficient system GMM estimator based on the Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) specifications. Standard errors are corrected 
using the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005).  Time dummies are included. The Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions confirms 
the validity of the instruments since the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The Arellano-Bond test, AR (2) in differences shows no second-order serial 
correlation in errors. 
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Relationship Between Trade Volume, Unreliability and Price Decline for Laptops (N = 622) 
 
 OLS 2SLS GMM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log[Competitors] 0.001***(0.0002) 0.001***(0.0002) 0.0015***(0.0002) 0.0015***(0.0002) 0.001***(0.0002) 
Log[Rating] -0.082**(0.01) -0.082***(0.01) -0.11***(0.015) -0.11***(0.015) -0.067***(0.01) 
Log[Life] 0.011***(0.001) 0.011***(0.001) 0.014***(0.002) 0.014***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 
Log[Condition] 0.072***(0.002) 0.072***(0.002) 0.1***(0.003) 0.1***(0.003) 0.043***(0.003) 
Log[Trade Volume] -0.056***(0.001) -0.05***(0.0005) -0.074***(0.002) -0.071***(0.001) -0.041***(0.001) 
Unreliability 0.042***(0.001) 0.04***(0.001) 0.054***(0.002) 0.051***(0.002) 0.03***(0.001) 
Log[TradeVolume]*Unreliability  -0.005***(0.0001)  -0.008***(0.0002) -0.004***(0.0001) 
Lagged Price Decline     0.16***(0.05) 
Constant -4.5***(0.1) -6.81***(0.1) -6.1***(0.21) -7.2***(0.22) -5.94***(0.12) 
R 2 (within) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  
 
Table 14: The dependent variable is Log of Price Decline. Estimates in columns (1) and (2) are based on OLS with model-seller fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis.  ***  and ** denote significance at 1% and 5% , respectively. Columns (3) and (4) use 2SLS to instrument for trade volume using 
lagged values of the same variable.  
Column (5) uses the efficient system GMM estimator based on the Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) specifications. Standard errors are corrected 
using the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005).  Time dummies are included. The Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions confirms 






Product condition related feedback 
Item was exactly as described. Very pleased. 
My box arrived banged up pretty bad with holes and broken foam. There was no bottom to the box. 
The back of the unit was smashed in!
Fantastic - received in excellent brand-new condition as promised. 
Great product, thanks. 
Seller service related feedback 
Absolute outstanding service, and extremely fast shipping. I highly recommend this seller to all 
amazon buyers !!!!!!!
No info available on when it would be available. It took several phone calls and emails to get 
refund.
Fast shipping, good communication...thanks. 
Shipping was unbelievable quick. I would definitely order from them again. 
Both product and seller related feedback 
Quick delivery! Camera was exactly as described. Would buy from this seller again. 
Fast shipping - arrived exactly as advertised. 
Super fast shipping. Excellent item. Perfect transaction. A high quality professional seller. Highly 
recommended!
Perfect packaging, responsive seller, product works just as described. 
 
Table A1: This table shows some examples of seller service related and product condition related 
feedback that was posted on Amazon for the sellers in our data. They include both positive and negative 





Figure 1a: Example of product condition disclosures by different sellers on Amazon for a used audio 
player. In this case, all three used good listings are of the ‘Like New’ category. The same interface also 
summarizes the reputation scores of each of the sellers, both in terms of the average rating and the 




Figure 1b: Fraction of the feedback profile for a seller, as displayed by Amazon. The interface shows the 
valence and volume of feedback postings as well the actual textual feedback. The first page shows the 
most recent 5 postings. 
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To demonstrate that the absence of information on seller size and inventory does not bias our results, we 
conduct various robustness checks by classifying sellers into small, medium and large sellers based on 
the volume of prior recorded transactions. In particular, we designated all sellers with less than 50,000 
feedback postings as “small sellers”, all sellers with 50,000 to 100,000 postings as “medium sellers” and 
all sellers with more than 100,000 postings as “large sellers”. As seen in Tables A1-A4 below, results 
from the main specification (model 1 of equation 1) are robust to the use of such sub-samples and 
remain the same qualitatively.  
 
Effect of Seller and Product Characteristics on Sale Time for PDAs 
Variable Small Sellers Medium Sellers Large Sellers 
Log[Sale Price] 0.12** (0.001) 0.1** (0.001) 0.05** (0.001) 
Log[Seller Rating] 0.22***(0.01) 0.2***(0.01) 0.06***(0.01) 
Log[Life] 0.19***(0.002) 0.23***(0.002) 0.1***(0.002) 
Log[Condition] 0.01 (0.01) 0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
Log[Competitors] -0.006 (0.004) -0.01 (0.008) -0.006 (0.004) 
Log[Offer Position] -0.006***(0.0001) -0.006***(0.0001) -0.006***(0.0001) 
R 2 (with Fixed Effects) 0.62 0.65 0.71 
Table A1: The dependent variable is Log of Sale Time. All models use OLS with product-seller fixed 




                        Effect of Seller and Product Characteristics on Sale Time for Digital Cameras 
Variable Small Sellers Medium Sellers Large Sellers 
Log[Sale Price] 0.03***(0.01) 0.02***(0.01) 0.1***(0.01)
Log[Seller Rating] 0.28***(0.01) 0.31***(0.02) 0.19***(0.02) 
Log[Life] 0.65***(0.04) 0.54***(0.05) 0.24***(0.06) 
Log[Condition] 0.04 (0.03) 0.052*** (0.022) 0.044*** (0.02) 
Log[Competitors] -0.02***(0.002) -0.02***(0.002) -0.05***(0.004) 
Log[Offer Position] -0.004***(0.0001) -0.005***(0.0001) -0.004***(0.0001) 
R 2 (with Fixed Effects) 0.73 0.71 0.71 
Table A2: The dependent variable is Log of Sale Time. All models use OLS with product-seller fixed 
























                   Effect of Seller and Product Characteristics on Sale Time for Audio Players 
Variable Small Sellers Medium Sellers Large Sellers 
Log[Sale Price] 0.31***(0.012) 0.28***(0.012) 0.36***(0.012) 
Log[Seller Rating] 0.29***(0.01) 0.32***(0.012) 0.25***(0.014) 
Log[Life] 0.051***(0.002) 0.048***(0.002) 0.028***(0.002) 
Log[Condition] 0.18***(0.01) 0.14***(0.01) 0.14***(0.015)
Log[Competitors] -0.002***(0.0002) -0.002***(0.0002) -0.001***(0.0002) 
Log[Offer Position] -0.003***(0.0001) -0.002***(0.0001) -0.003***(0.0001) 
R 2 (with Fixed Effects) 0.76 0.78 0.8 
Table A3: The dependent variable is Log of Sale Time. All models use OLS with product-seller fixed 








Effect of Seller and Product Characteristics on Sale Time for Laptops 
Variable Small Sellers Medium Sellers Large Sellers 
Log[Sale Price] 0.035***(0.001) 0.029***(0.001) 0.038***(0.001) 
Log[Seller Rating] 0.67***(0.01) 0.75***(0.01) 0.56***(0.01) 
Log[Life] 0.12***(0.001) 0.15***(0.001) 0.07***(0.001) 
Log[Condition] 0.065***(0.001) 0.042***(0.001) 0.045***(0.001) 
Log[Competitors] 0.0005**(0.0003) 0.001**(0.0003) 0.001**(0.0003) 
Log[Offer Position] -0.001***(0.0001) -0.001***(0.0001) -0.001***(0.0001) 
R 2  0.72 0.81 0.74 
Table A4: The dependent variable is Log of Sale Time. All models use OLS with product-seller 






   
